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Abstract:  
 
  The aim of this paper is to illuminate the ways in which working class women are 
invisible within the feminist and ecofeminist movements. Using the faces and forces of 
oppression as presented by Iris Marion Young and Hilde Lindemann, I show how the 
working class experiences oppression. I also show how oppression based on class differs 
from that based on gender and how these differences contribute to the invisibility of 
working class women within feminism. In the second section, I use Val Plumwood and 
Karen J. Warren’s versions of ecofeminist philosophy to show how working class women 
are again absent. Were ecofeminists to include working class women, specifically rural 
folks and farmers, the idea of attunedness to the land could be both better understood and 
incorporated within the environmental movement at large.  
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Within the past, second-wave feminism focused almost exclusively on the 
oppression experienced by middle class white women, at the expense of women of color, 
lesbians, working class and third-world women.  However, this failing has been corrected 
with the current emphasis on building a more diverse, multicultural, multiethnic, 
multisexual movement emphasizing greater reflectivity and inclusion, recognizing the 
multiple causes, forms and ways to dismantle oppression. Because of this, Rosemarie 
Tong states that “feminist theory is not one, but many, theories or perspectives and that 
each feminist theory or perspective attempts to describe women’s oppression, to explain 
its causes and consequences, and to prescribe strategies for women’s liberation” (1).  
Ecofeminism incorporates a similar emphasis on diversity and inclusion, 
recognizing that “there are important connections between the unjustified domination of 
women, people of color, children, and the poor and the unjustified domination of nature,” 
as stated by Karen J. Warren in Ecofeminist Philosophies: A Western Perspective on 
What It Is and Why It Matters (1). Regardless of these proclamations of inclusion, I read 
feminist and ecofeminist works and do not see myself reflected there. I do not see 
working class women or rural people, neither our voices nor our insights. To recover 
these experiences, I will be exploring the historical connections feminism and 
ecofeminism have with issues of class, the ways this issue is invisible today and the 
metrocentrism present within the movements, as well as the ways feminism, ecofeminism 
and the working class can benefit from a renewed focus on class oppression.  
 Beginning with feminism, both the Marxist and socialist branches of feminism 
examine the intersection of gender and class oppression. Critiquing the Marxist view that 
class best explains women’s oppression, socialist feminists hold the position that gender 
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and class are forces that play equal roles, and thus deserve equal attention, when 
discussing women’s oppression (Tong 39). As an example of a socialist feminist, Iris 
Marion Young sees the marginalization of women, and consequentially our role as a 
secondary labor force, as an essential and fundamental characteristic of capitalism, in that 
capitalism and patriarchy are so intertwined they cannot be discussed separately (Tong 
184-5). Only by such an approach can we understand why it is women who take orders, 
do the unstimulating work on the undesirable shifts for less pay, who experience the 
majority of sexual harassment and perform most uncompensated domestic work. As we 
experience oppression not just as women and not just as workers, and construct our 
identities according to the unique and multiple ways we are located socially, an 
examination of women’s oppression must take into account both gender and class, as well 
as race, nationality, sexuality, etc, in order to be accurate.  
 Ecofeminism has a similar connection with issues of class in its history as well. 
As Noël Sturgeon discusses in Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory and 
Political Action, the ecofeminist movement has numerous origins, each branch taking 
slightly different theoretical positions and focusing on different aspects, given the 
specific contexts in which it developed (3). One such beginning occurred in close 
connection with social ecology. Begun by Murray Bookchin, social ecology is a 
movement focusing on the elimination of all social hierarchies (including that of humans 
over nature), the critique of capitalism and the promotion of sustainable ecological 
relationships (Sturgeon 32). In addition to these theoretical similarities, Bookchin’s 
Institute for Social Ecology housed the first courses on ecofeminism and early 
ecofeminists such as Ynestra King. Labeled as one of the founders of US ecofeminism 
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and a social ecofeminist, King’s writing illustrates the similarities between these two 
fields of study, as well as the emphasis on class that early ecofeminism contained and 
subsequentially lost. In her article “The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of 
Ecology,” King states one of the four main beliefs of ecofeminism as the idea that: 
Biological simplification, i.e. the wiping out of whole species, corresponds 
to reducing human diversity into faceless workers, or to the 
homogenization of taste and culture through mass consumer markets. 
Social life and natural life are literally simplified to the inorganic for the 
convenience of market society. Therefore we need a decentralized global 
movement that is founded on common interests yet celebrates diversity 
and opposes all forms of domination and violence. (20) 
 
It is not simply that women are oppressed via their class position, but that class 
oppression, the domination of the natural world and the oppression of women are all 
essential components in the structure of our current society. In order to restructure our 
society in a just way, we cannot simply look at the intersections of classism and naturism 
or naturism and sexism, but must create a comprehensive movement in which each 
component plays an equal role.  
Having gestured toward the ways in which feminism and ecofeminism have a 
historical concern for issues of class, I will now look at the ways this issue has faded into 
the realm of invisibility, beginning with feminism. As mentioned, in response to second-
wave feminism, a strong focus today is on the lack of inclusivity within feminism of 
women of color, third-world women and lesbians, and the multiple ways in which these 
women experience oppression. Consequentially, the necessity of including diverse voices 
and recognizing intersecting systems of oppression when creating theories and initiating 
changes receives significant attention. However, even with this increased focus on 
inclusivity, the oppression experienced by working class women within the US has been 
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overshadowed by the more visible issues of racism, and to perhaps a lesser degree, 
imperialism, given in part the tendency to generalize all white women as middle class. By 
traveling into the world of working class women we can begin to understand the faces 
and forces this form of oppression takes, the extent to which it is made invisible, how 
feminism’s lack of attention perpetuates this system of inequality and domination, and 
the responses and actions required of feminists and society as a whole. 
In her article, “On the Logic of Pluralist Feminism,” María C. Lugones critiques 
white feminist academics for recognizing the problem of difference, or the need to 
include a diverse range of voices within feminism, as it pertains to theorizing about 
women as a homogenous group, but failing to recognize actual difference, such as the 
different ways women identify, experience oppression, or view the world (38). The 
problem with this generalization lies not only in white women exercising authority over 
women of color, a process that results in white women becoming the experts regarding 
the lives of women of color, but ignoring their differences also perpetuates the oppression 
of women of color by creating the feeling that “one is about to be erased from the 
discourse by being asked to speak in or to listen to a universal voice” (Lugones, “Logic” 
39). With this, Lugones points out the inconsistency of feminists to demand women’s 
inclusion, contribution and recognition, while at the same time failing to do so 
themselves.  
 Unfortunately, a slight inconsistency exists in Lugones’ writing as well, in that 
she does not explicitly acknowledge or address any differences between white women, 
grouping us all under the homogenous terms “white women,” “white/anglo women,” or 
“white women theorists” (“Logic” 38, 39, 40). Even though the majority of white women 
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write from at least a middle class perspective (though academic professionals actually 
occupy a position higher than the middle class), failing to notice the differences among 
white women perpetuates the assumption that all white women feminists belong to higher 
classes. Though this may be a justifiable and understandable assumption, in that most 
white theorists are from higher classes and because this generalization strengthens 
Lugones’ critique, it is unacceptable in that not all of us come from, or speak from, a 
similar background. When including assumed class homogeneity within her writing, 
Lugones perpetuates the erasure of working class voices from academia and the 
continued ignorance of issues effecting working class women, both of which maintain 
class oppression.   
A specific example of Lugones’ inconsistent demand for inclusivity and 
recognition occurs in her article “Playfulness, ‘World’-Traveling, and Loving 
Perspective.” When discussing her relationship with her mother, Lugones states, “I 
thought that to love her was consistent with my abusing her (using, taking for granted, 
and demanding her services [)] . . . I was not supposed to love servants  I could abuse 
them without identifying with them, without seeing myself in them” (“Playfulness” 5). 
The problem lies in that she loved her mother but loving her was not consistent with 
treating her like a servant, with the implicit assumption Lugones makes being that 
servants were treated poorly and her mother ought to be treated better. Thus, she had to 
learn a new way to treat her mother, which necessitated traveling into her mother’s world 
to learn who her mother was, on her mother’s own terms. What I find disturbing is that 
though Lugones says we ought not treat our mothers like servants, she does not address 
how we ought to treat servants, whether or not people are justified in abusing them. I am 
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concerned that Lugones’ failure to critique the treatment of servants continues to hide and 
treat as unimportant the oppression experienced by the working class. 
By traveling into the world of working class women, my world and the world of 
my mother, those who are of a different, higher socioeconomic position “can understand 
what it is to be them [working class] and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes” to a 
greater degree (Lugones, “Playfulness” 17). This journey will also help show how and 
why the oppression of the working class becomes and remains hidden and ignored, as 
invisibility is a specific aspect of oppression overlooked by Hilde Lindemann in An 
Invitation to Feminist Ethics and given inadequate attention by Iris Marion Young in 
Justice and the Politics of Difference.  
However, before traveling into the working class world, a general understanding 
of what this term means is helpful. Like many terms describing social phenomena, 
“working class” does not easily allow for a concrete, universal and timeless definition. 
Rather than attempting to provide one specific factor determining working class status, 
such as income, The Center for Working-Class Studies at Youngstown State University 
sees “class as based on a combination of factors—what kind of work people do, how 
much they earn, their social and economic power, their education, lifestyle, and culture.” 
Likewise, as Gail Hebson states in “Renewing Class Analysis in Studies of the 
Workplace: A Comparison of Working-Class and Middle-Class Women’s Aspirations 
and Identities,” the new approach to discussions of class are based on the “recognition 
that employment categories cannot capture the dynamic and emotive ways that class is 
lived” (28). In this respect, class is not simply an economic category but is a culture, a 
way of life, an identity. That being said, a general definition of the term “working class,” 
 
 
7 
as used within this paper, is necessary. Within our culture, this social class consists of 
unionized and skilled workers; the “working poor,” i.e. non-unionized and unskilled 
workers; and the “poor,” those whose income comes primarily from welfare. Coming 
from a Midwestern “Right to Work” state that blurs the distinction between the working 
class and the working poor by decreasing, if not eliminating, the presence and benefits of 
union forces, I will use the term working class, though not everything I say will apply to 
everyone who identifies as working class.  
 Within Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young discusses four faces of 
oppression readily applicable to the experience of the working class, including 
exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and marginalization (48-63). Though 
these faces often overlap, I will attempt to discuss them separately, beginning with 
exploitation. In perhaps overly simplistic but readily understandable terms, capitalism 
focuses on the consumption of goods and services, with the profitability and efficiency of 
this system dictating the means of production of the demanded goods and services. When 
the bottom line consists of the profit margin, this system necessitates the invisibility of 
the resources, both natural and human, as recognition of their actual value would require 
better treatment. In order to reach maximum profit, the working class generally does not 
receive a living wage, nor are we given reasonable working hours, with mandatory 
overtime, inadequate sick leave and drastic, unexpected changes in schedules and cuts in 
hours. This understanding of the exploitation of the working class, especially when 
thought of in terms of the manufacturing industry, is not a new idea, having roots in 
Marxism, nor has it affected the consumptive patterns of much of the Western world. 
Acknowledging the extent of worker exploitation necessitates better treatment and 
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benefits, higher wages, and in many cases, more expensive products, given the emphasis 
on a high profit margin. Thus, having an exploitable class of workers is essential to our 
capitalistic, growth- and profit-oriented system. 
 Women within the working class experience particular vulnerability to 
exploitation. During the hiring process, women are often not the preferred worker, in that 
men are seen as more dependable than women, owing to our tendency to get pregnant and 
require maternity leave and additional time off to care for sick children and ailing 
parents. Though the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares this practice illegal, it is often the 
unspoken, though occasionally specifically stated, preference.1 Thus, when we do find 
employment, especially given the current economic recession, we are more willing to 
work for the $0.75 we receive on average compared to the dollar a white man would 
make. The result is there being “more women among the poor than men,” a phenomena 
known as the “feminization of poverty,” as stated by Devaki Jain in Women, 
Development, and the UN – A Sixty-Year Quest for Equality (107). Regardless of what 
the Great American Dream states, when you do not make enough money to support your 
family, you do not have the option of pursuing the education necessary to qualify for a 
better paying job. This creates a situation in which working class women will settle for 
whatever exploitive jobs we can get, simply because we have no other option.  
Hilde Lindemann articulates this phenomenon when discussing the pressive force 
of oppression, which occurs when “the group is pressed into serving members of the 
dominant group,” largely because the structure of society does not allow for any other 
option (34). An example analogous to the pressive force compelling the working class to 
                                                
1 During a job interview in the summer of 2007, a potential employer stated she did not like to hire women 
with children because they could not be depended on – they would come to work late, miss shifts because 
of sick children or have to leave before the work was done to pick up their children from day care. 
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serve the middle class is the way wives were once compelled to serve their husbands. 
When society was structured so that women could not seek education or employment 
outside the home, pressive forces first compelled women to marry and then continually 
serve their husbands so as to maintain this relationship, a relationship which often was 
their only means of survival (Lindemann 35). The preservative force Lindemann 
discusses likewise plays a role in perpetuating the exploitation of working class women 
by maintaining the status quo (36). Like the housewives of the past, the working class 
women of today are forced to settle for less than we deserve.    
 In addition to financial difficulties resulting from exploitation, Lindemann states 
“exploitation causes groups of people to be identified primarily as resources for other 
people, requiring them to serve these others’ interests” (32). The working class orientates 
around and caters to the interest of the middle class as the primary consumers of goods 
and service, given the economic disparity. As such, the middle class dictates the 
production of specific goods and services, which consequentially dictate the 
manufacturing jobs available to the working class. Within the service sector specifically, 
as an unstated condition of employment, we are required to cater to the middle class 
customers—fetching what they want fetched, listening without comment to what they 
say, standing at attention, and tidying up after them. Our survival necessitates such 
action, in that if we do not act the servant to the customer, they will shop elsewhere, 
leaving us with no job and no way to support our families and ourselves. In this way, 
serving the customer becomes a necessary condition for employment, though being seen 
as a servant is not. In Kantian terms, we are treated only as a means to an end, without 
being recognized as ends in ourselves. When our economic system requires, to a large 
 
 
10 
degree, that we be identified as resources, it is far too easy to see us as servants rather 
than people who happen to serve you. 
 Though the consequences of exploitation are oppressive, there also exists a deeper 
level to this oppression that Marilyn Frye’s concept of the arrogant eye gestures towards. 
As she states in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory, the arrogant perceiver 
views the world and everything in it as being made for himself, rather than seeing the 
independence of the other, with a significant aspect of sexism involving “dis-integrating 
an integrated human organism and grafting its substance to oneself” (Frye 67, 75, 66). 
When applied to the working class, we are seen only as workers, as expendable and 
exploitable. We are not seen as the valuable people we see ourselves as when we are in 
our world. In a very real sense, we are not allowed to be, or recognized as, full human 
beings with goals and desires of our own. In this way, arrogant perceivers “organize 
everything seen with reference to themselves and their own interests” (Frye 67). When 
seen through the eyes and according to the terms of the arrogant perceiver, the extent of 
our exploitation, the resulting harms, and our position as quasi-human resources remains 
invisible.  
 Young lists powerlessness as the second face of oppression, which in the case of 
the working class ties inextricably to exploitation. According to her, “The powerless are 
those who lack authority or power [in relation to others] . . . those over whom power is 
exercised without their exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take 
orders and rarely have the right to give them . . . [who] have little or no work authority” 
(Young 56). Within this sense, the majority of the working class lack power to a 
significant or total degree, in that we are allowed no contribution when deciding work 
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hours, etc, nor do we have power over others within the work world, (though we may 
have legitimate power over children within the household). Additional components of 
powerlessness include the lack of “an expansive, progressive character,” in that the 
working class lacks a significant opportunity for professional development, and also does 
not enjoy the privilege of respectability (Young 57). However, though these are all 
important ways in which the working class is made and kept powerless, they are rather 
superficial in that they only refer to specific instances of powerlessness experienced 
because a person is working class. A more detailed discussion of how powerlessness 
itself is oppressive in general is necessary in order to better understand the oppression of 
the working class.  
 As a powerless group, the working class lacks the opportunity to change the 
situations or social positions we find ourselves in. As bell hooks states in “Feminist 
Scholarship: Ethical Issues” oppressed groups are no longer subjects but objects whose 
“reality is defined by others,” whose “identity is created by others” (42). The financial 
difficulties we experience because of exploitation dictates, to a large degree, the reality 
we experience on a daily basis, as do the stereotypes that we are less intelligent and/or 
motivated that the upper classes. In either case, we have little to no power to change the 
material circumstances or views others have of us. Frye’s discussion of the arrogant eye 
is helpful in understanding this degree of powerlessness. As she states, one with an 
arrogant eye “manipulates the environment, perception and judgment of her whom he 
perceives so that her recognized options are limited, and the course she chooses will be 
such as coheres with his purposes,” creating “in the space about him a sort of vacuum 
mold into which the other is sucked and held” (Frye 67, 69). In the case of class, the 
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arrogant eye manipulates our society by forcing the working class into exploitable and 
powerless situations so that we have few, if any, legitimate employment options that are 
not in service of the middle class. The structure of the social world results in the working 
class having no choice other than to be working class. At this point, exploitation fuels 
powerlessness, in that many of us experience exploitation to the degree that no other 
option is financially feasible; we are thus placed in a situation in which we have little to 
no power over our lives as they are and even less power to choose a different life. 
Working class women experience powerlessness to a greater degree than their male 
counterparts, given our greater experience of, and vulnerability to, exploitation.   
 Two stories exist within our society that need to be addressed in order to 
understand the extent and perpetuation of powerlessness, as well as the ways this form of 
oppression remains invisible, specifically the glorification of the working class as the 
“Heart of America” and the Great American Dream. In Lindemann’s terms, these stories 
are master narratives, which “provide the character types and plot templates that let you 
locate yourself (or other people) within your society” (49). These master narratives are 
particularly interesting in that by giving the working class a false sense of power, society 
is allowed to ignore our actual circumstances, the extent to which we are powerless and 
oppressed. As our society as a whole, and the middle and upper classes in particular, 
benefit from having a powerless and exploitable class, it is in the interest of those in 
higher positions to create stories that maintain the status quo. For this reason, these 
stories tell us not only who we are but contain a strong prescriptive element and tell us 
how we ought to behave.  
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The first master narrative states that the working class is the “Heart of America,” 
the backbone of society, an important, valuable, respected and essential component of our 
country. The implicit prescriptive element states that there exists no oppression of the 
working class, in that we receive proper appreciation and respect. Even if we sometimes 
feel unappreciated, the cause we are working for, i.e. America, is great enough to make 
up for any difficulties we may experience. This provides an illustration of Lindemann’s 
dismissive force of oppression, in that a group is tolerated, in this case given a 
supposedly respected place in our societal narrative, as long as they do not demand any 
goods and services enjoyed by the upper classes or question why they are not entitled to 
them as well (35). So long as we accept our place within this story we are seen as 
valuable.  
This narrative is problematic first and foremost because it is false. We are not 
shown the respect and appreciation we deserve, either as workers or as human beings. 
Secondly, when it does occur, the lionization of the working class is only a temporary 
acknowledgement, most noticeably used during election years. When the elections are 
over and our votes acquired, we are again invisible. Even if used consistently, the “Heart 
of America” is a problematic identity for the working class as it simplifies our existence 
into that of dedicated, hardworking folks serving a noble purpose. This ignores the 
exploitation, powerlessness, expendability and anger we see and feel every day. In 
addition to perpetuating the invisibility of our oppression, this romanticizing of our lives 
attempts to placate us by providing the illusion of importance and recognition, in a way 
similar to the traditional glorification of women as the keepers of morality within the 
household. This romanticization serves yet another purpose, in that it provides those in 
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positions of greater power a way around the guilt they may or may not but ought to feel 
regarding the oppression of the working class, their role as oppressor and the benefits 
they receive from the oppression of the working class. In this rose-colored picture, the 
workers are not only not oppressed, but the middle class is, in fact, doing us a service by 
providing the means to develop into the hardworking, dependable, down-to-earth, 
virtuous selves everyone admires. Admitting the truth of the situation would show the 
middle class themselves “as a duplicitous person,” a self “inattentive to our interactions,” 
a self who’s “rules are used against us,” a self that is oppressive to working class women 
(Lugones, “Logic” 42). 
 The Great American Dream likewise serves the purpose of keeping the working 
class powerless, though in an opposite manner from the romanticization of the working 
class. The Great American Dream tells us that anyone who works hard enough can 
transcend their original working class position and enter into the middle or upper 
classes—we can all pull ourselves up by our bootstraps. This story is problematic in that 
it ignores the fact that it is extremely hard to pull yourself up by your bootstraps when 
you do not make enough money to buy boots, that is, it ignores the actual situation, 
difficulties and oppression experienced by members of the working class. Specifically, it 
ignores the powerlessness we experience as a result of being working class, e.g. financial 
hardships, and how powerlessness keeps us working class. Even with the extreme 
difficulty of class mobility, a few token examples exist serving to perpetuate this myth so 
the oppression can remain invisible. Aside from the practical problems of pulling oneself 
up by one’s bootstraps, this story carries with it strong normative aspects. If everyone can 
succeed through hard work and one woman cannot, then she is at fault and not working 
 
 
15 
hard enough, never mind the fact she works two jobs. This is a disturbing version of 
victim blaming that continually allows the system and classes that create, maintain and 
benefit from oppressed classes to deny any responsibility. 
 These master narratives aside, those in powerless situations often experience the 
wrongful accusation of possessing a false consciousness, in which working class folks are 
seen as not fully aware of our own oppression and often make choices that either 
perpetuate or worsen our situations. As Susan Moller Okin states in “Gender Inequality 
and Cultural Differences,” this results in situations in which “oppressed people have . . . 
internalized their oppression so well that they have no sense of what they are justly 
entitled to as human beings,” thus “committed outsiders can often be better analysts and 
critics of social injustices than those who live within the relevant culture” (19). One 
example of the false consciousness the working class supposedly possesses involves our 
shopping habits. As society states, it is in the best interest of the working class to support 
local, independently owned businesses and whole foods co-ops that provide locally 
grown and/or produced, environmentally and socially just products, and decent wages 
and benefits to employees, even though this often results in higher prices that we cannot 
easily afford. If and when we shop at the big box stores, we are accused of being falsely 
conscious in that it is not in the best interest of us as a class to support such stores, given 
that they often so not treat their working employees as well as other companies do. As 
these actions show that we do not understand what is in our best interests, and because 
the middle and upper classes do understand supporting environmentally and socially just 
stores is to the working class’s benefit, they are better able to tell us how we ought to act. 
This is simply not the case. We are well aware that it is in the long-term best interests of 
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the working class to support such stores. However, it is often a short-term necessity that 
we buy the most inexpensive items available, thus placing us in a position where both 
available options are far from ideal. Given the degree to which the difficulties we face 
remain invisible to the middle class, as well as the pervasiveness of the “Heart of 
America” and American Dream myths, they cannot be the experts on what we need and 
desire. Inaccurately claiming that the working class suffers from false consciousness 
continues the stereotypical and oppressive description of the working class as 
unintelligent, ignorant and in need of paternalistic treatment from outsiders. This 
perpetuates the assumption that we are powerless for a reason and that we ought to 
remain so. 
 Though accused of false consciousness, the working class actually holds an 
excellent position for developing a double consciousness. As W.E.B. Du Bois states in 
The Souls of Black Folk, African-Americans “are gifted with second-sight in this 
American world,--a world which . . . only lets him see himself through the revelation of 
the other world . . . this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self 
through the eyes of another . . . One ever feels his twoness,--an American, a Negro; two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings” (3). What I interpret Du Bois as saying 
is that African-Americans were, in his time, defined by the dominant white culture as 
subordinate, while the individuals themselves created a more positive and accurate 
identity. However, the dominant society also influenced this counter-identity. As stated, 
De Bois lived in a world that would only let him see himself through the eyes of the 
dominant culture; thus, any identity he could create would be, in part, responding to what 
the dominant culture said he must be. Thus, even when not in the presence of the 
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dominant culture, Du Bois still felt himself as two people, in that he had internalized, 
though not accepted, the identity of an African-American man as created by the dominant 
culture.  
 A similar dual consciousness phenomenon occurs within the working class. As 
mentioned earlier in regards to exploitation, the working class becomes a resource for and 
required servant to the middle and upper classes, as the primary consumers dictating the 
production of specific goods and services. As workers, we must travel into the world of 
our middle class employers and consumers, first to determine, and then to provide, the 
services they desire. If we do not cater to what the middle class consumers and employers 
desire, our employment becomes insecure at best. However, in order to do so, we must 
first understand as completely as possible the world they live in—what they want, how 
they want it and how they want us to act when we meet. To use Lugones’ words, the 
working class necessarily travels into the middle class world for purposes of 
employment. As such, members of the working class often feel a sense of what Du Bois 
calls twoness, in that we exist in the middle class as an “other.” Thus, we need to know 
how to function both in our world and in the world of the middle class. The possession of 
a dual consciousness and feelings of twoness are both consequences of cultural 
imperialism, a process in which the dominant culture “render[s] the particular perspective 
of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it 
out as the Other” (Young 58-59).  
 The working class’s double consciousness and travel into the middle class world 
brings me to yet another face of oppression—cultural imperialism. As Young defines the 
term, “cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group’s 
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experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm” (59). She likewise claims that 
cultural imperialism exists as an oppressive force outside the system of labor, presumably 
because capitalistic societies require exploitation and powerlessness to function (Young 
58). I, however, disagree, because cultural imperialism is an essential component of 
powerlessness and necessary for the continued growth of capitalism. Take, for example, 
the imperialism that occurs between the so-called developed and undeveloped countries. 
Developed countries use cultural imperialism to destroy, or at least subvert, another 
culture, taking for themselves the other country’s natural and human resources, and 
attempting to instill Western consumptive patterns so as to increase their product market. 
A similar phenomenon occurs within the American class system, when middle class 
culture is pushed on the working class.  
 When interacting across class lines, the required mannerisms are those of the 
middle class, necessary if we want to acquire and maintain employment. Additionally, 
when attempting to interact within the middle class professional world, as occurs if and 
when we need to visit a lawyer, accountant or loan officer, we must emulate to the 
highest degree possible the mannerisms of the middle class, we must dress 
“appropriately” and speak properly. In this way, the middle class requires the working 
class to adopt their culture when in the public sphere. Lindemann refers to this as a 
preservative force, in which “the dominant group considers this group abnormal, which 
keeps its sense of what is normal in place” (36). The working class must conform to the 
standards of the middle class, which reinforces them as the norm. Respect often dictates 
this emulation, in that resources, including human, are not the types of things that require 
respect. Thus, to receive respectful treatment, we must pass as middle class. The 
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requirement to act in a way dictated by the middle class when at work and when 
conducting other transactions conveys a clear message, the message that we, as working 
class people, are simply not good enough. We are other and we are inferior.  
 The establishment of the middle class way of life as the norm carries beyond the 
world of business into our personal lives as well. As Frye states, the arrogant eye creates 
the norms of virtue and health, “set according to the degree of congruence of the object of 
perception with the seer’s interests” (69). In the context of sexism, women were, and far 
too often still are, seen as virtuous and healthy when conforming to the standards the 
dominant males set. As it pertains to issues of class, the working class is healthy and 
proper when emulating the standards set by the middle class. Take, for example, the 
American Dream that says we ought to be working to become middle class. Poor folks 
receive considerably more respect and sympathy when we show we do buy into the 
American Dream and are doing everything we can to achieve a middle class life. We are 
not supposed to want to remain in our working class neighborhoods, to be content eating 
casseroles, to spend our free time playing pool rather than hiking. If we enjoy these 
activities and wish to continue living a working class lifestyle, we are segregated into 
different neighborhoods and our culture is marginalized. As Lindemann and Young state, 
expulsion is another force and marginalization is another face of oppression that work to 
deny entire categories of people full participation in social life (Lindemann 35, Young 
53). If content and happy with who we are, we are called poor white trash—we become 
garbage that ought to be gotten rid of, or at least confined to the “bad part of town.” This 
message of inferiority goes beyond our lifestyles—it is not just our chosen way of life 
that becomes trash, we become trash. When the middle class is never required, and 
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clearly does not desire, to enter into the world of the working class, this segregation and 
class oppression is maintained, as is the stereotype that all working class people do, in 
fact, live this way.   
 I would like to discuss in more detail one last issue regarding the oppression of 
working class women, the issue of respect. As Young states, “To treat people with 
respect is to be prepared to listen to what they have to say or to do what they request 
because they have some authority, expertise, or influence” (57). In addition to supporting, 
furthering and contributing to the oppression of the working class, many of the factors 
already discussed lead to a practice in which the working class in general, and working 
class women in specific, are not treated with adequate, if any, respect. The false 
consciousness Okin and others accuse the working class of possessing takes away our 
authority of lived experience regarding what we want and what we need. When we do not 
know ourselves, there is little reason for any other to listen to or value what we have to 
say. The systematic powerlessness we experience also works to take away any influence 
we could have. The American Dream myth and the romaticization of the working class 
via the “Heart of America” narrative work to make our experiences and oppression 
unimportant, or at least not important enough require a response from society at large or 
feminism in particular. When we are not important enough to elicit a response, it is clear 
that no one is listening to what we have to say. Cultural imperialism and marginalization 
state quite clearly that in order to receive respect we must become or emulate the middle 
class, as it is only those who are in or above this social level that are worthy of respect. 
This lack of respect for us as people and as working class is not only an oppressive 
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consequence of being working class, but is also a force that keeps us oppressed by 
reinforcing the idea that we are not important.  
 When bringing this discussion of the oppression of working class women back 
into the specific context of feminist academia, I turn once again to third-wave feminist 
developments. With these developments, feminists realize the necessity of including a 
range of diverse, multicultural, multiethnic and multisexual voices, given the different 
ways women identify, experience oppression and view the world. Unfortunately, 
recognizing these differences does not, and did not, necessarily lead to viewing the world 
through a loving, as opposed to arrogant, eye. According to Frye, the loving eye “knows 
the independence of the other,” “is the eye of one who knows that to know the seen, one 
must consult something other than one’s own will and interests and fears and 
imagination,” an eye that will “look and listen and check and question” (75). In 
Lugones’s terms, the loving perceiver realizes that in order to truly understand working 
class women, one must travel into our world, repeatedly, for extended periods of time and 
with a playful, though not agonistic, heart, so as to know us on our own terms 
(“Playfulness” 15-16).  
 The problem is not that feminists within academia possess the traditional arrogant 
eye regarding the working class, in that they often gesture briefly towards classism and 
list it as an additional form of oppression. Unfortunately, these token references do not 
qualify as a letting go of arrogance in favor of love. Rather, the replacement has been 
made with loving, knowing ignorance, a position that still incorporates aspects of 
arrogant perception while claiming to love working class women. As Mariana Ortega 
states in “Being Lovingly, Knowingly Ignorant: White Feminism and Women of Color,” 
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loving, knowing ignorance occurs when there is “an ignorance of the thought and 
experience of women of color that is accompanied by both alleged love for and alleged 
knowledge about them” (57). In the case of women of color, this occurs when a white 
woman cites works done by women of color, both to legitimize those works and her 
status as a third-wave feminist, thus using women of color for her own end and 
perpetuating the academic authority of white women (Ortega 62). What has not happened 
in the case of the lovingly, knowingly ignorant feminist is the checking and questioning 
requirements of loving perception necessary to ensure accurate representation of 
experiences and reality that does not reinforce a dominant world view (Ortega 61). Both 
components are necessary in order to recognize the value in the world of working class 
women and the academic feminists’ oppression of working class women. If they were to 
check and question, feminists would see the extent to which they create a separate world 
for themselves, a world of privilege uncomfortable and oppressive to working class 
women. 
  The ways academic feminist are lovingly, knowingly ignorant of the oppression 
of working class women in the US becomes clear first through their failure to adequately 
address this issue. Take, for example, Alison Jaggar’s article “Global Responsibility and 
Western Feminism.” Within this article, Jaggar mentions how the oppression of women 
intensifies when conjoined with class oppression; however, she quickly focuses on how 
this effects third-world women, rather than women in this country (185). Likewise, she 
encourages us to focus on the ways we, as Westerners, contribute to the oppression of 
third-world women, while never mentioning the ways Western women contribute to the 
oppression of working class women in the US (Jaggar 193). When mentioning the 
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oppression of US working class women, the focus tends to be on the oppression resulting 
from being working class, such as the difficulties in providing for our families, as 
previously mentioned. However, when this discussion occurs within academia and does 
not involve the insight of actual working class women, it remains incomplete and 
inaccurate. In this case, the feminists may well love us; they may well know something 
about our lives, but they do not really see us, or know the extent of our oppression, or 
love us enough to include us. Until working class women become visible, respected and 
able to tell our own stories within the feminist movement, feminists may claim to be 
concerned with class oppression but will remain lovingly, knowingly ignorant.  
 In order to move beyond the lovingly, knowingly ignorant stance feminism takes 
towards working class women, feminists will have to acknowledge the benefits they 
receive from systems of class exploitation. As Young states, women experience “specific 
forms of gender exploitation in which their energies and power are expended, often 
unnoticed and unacknowledged, usually to benefit men by releasing them for more 
important and creative work, [and] enhancing their status or the environment around 
them” (51). These aspects easily apply to the middle class and higher positioned 
academic feminists. However scary it may be to look into a mirror that projects them as 
the less-than-perfect, socially just and non-oppressive women they may like to think of 
themselves as, they must look into that mirror, as Lugones suggests (“Logic” 42-3). As 
she states, “You may not want to think about that self, but not thinking about that self 
leads you not to know what U.S. women of color know:--that self-knowledge is 
interactive, that self-change is interactive” (Lugones, “Logic” 43). At the most basic 
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level, feminism must focus on and address the multiple ways working class women 
experience oppression in order to live up to its own standards.  
 The idea of third-wave feminists embodying loving, knowing ignorance leads to 
my critique of ecofeminism, in that much of the theoretical work within this field takes a 
similar stance towards working class women, specifically rural women and farmers, and 
incorporates a significant degree of metrocentrism. However, before beginning this 
discussion, it is helpful to clarify why rural folks and farmers are working class, and why 
we, specifically as rural people, ought to be included within ecofeminism.  Many rural 
folks are easily categorized as working class according to the definitions of unionized and 
skilled or non-unionized and unskilled workers, given our employment within the 
manufacturing, service and skilled trade industries. Unfortunately, farmers do not easily 
fit within the popular definitions of these class categories. Though neither provides 
specific definitions of working class occupations, both Hebson and The Center for 
Working-Class Studies limit their discussion of the working class to the manufacturing 
and service industries (Hebson 32, Center). However, the amount of manual labor our job 
entails, our differences from the standard middle class norm and, more importantly, our 
culture, lifestyles and identities all tell us that we are not members of the middle class. 
We understand quite well that we are working class, even if we do not fit the standard 
definition.  
In order to illuminate the ways in which we, as rural folks, farmers and women, 
experience invisibility, powerlessness, marginalization and cultural imperialism, and 
consequentially the ways in which a rural perspective could strengthen ecofeminism, I 
will be focusing specifically on Val Plumwood’s version of ecofeminism as found in the 
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texts Feminism and the Mastery of Nature and “The Concept of a Cultural Landscape: 
Nature, Culture and Agency in the Land,” and Karen J. Warren’s position as contained in 
Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. 
However, before I do so, it is again important to note that I will be speaking specifically 
from a rural North Dakotan perspective, from a community of small family farmers. As 
such, I will be speaking of farmer as family farmers, in contrast to those involved in big 
business, i.e. agribusiness farming. Additionally, what I say may not be true of every 
farmer, though hopefully will be an accurate representation of many. 
 Like many feminists, Val Plumwood, one of the more prominent names within 
ecofeminism, also presents a position of loving, knowing ignorance towards working 
class women in her book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. To summarize her 
theoretical approach, Plumwood focuses on the five-part dualistic construction of society 
through which “the colonised are appropriated, incorporated, into the selfhood and 
culture of the master, which forms their identity” (Feminism 41). Beginning with 
backgrounding, the master makes use of the other for material survival and for the 
creation of his identity as master (Plumwood, Feminism 48-9). However, this dependency 
must be denied so as to maintain a position of superiority, done through inessentializing 
the work and existence of the other (Plumwood, Feminism 48-9). In Youngian terms, this 
is a complex process in which the other, though materially and definitionally necessary, 
is rendered powerless through the denial of their contributions, with the goal of reducing 
the other to invisibility as they “are simply not ‘worth’ noticing” (Plumwood, Feminism 
48). As the second component, radical exclusion plays a significant role in this 
backgrounding, in that the master focuses on differences and downplays commonalities 
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between the two groups, creating “not merely a difference of degree within a sphere of 
overall similarity, but a major difference in kind, even a bifurcation or division in 
reality,” (Plumwood, Feminism 50). Once these separate realities have been created, 
incorporation, or relational definition, comes into play in that the subordinate is defined 
in relation to the master as a lack and as inferior, a process which involves 
homogenization, in that the master views the others as possessing no differences within 
the group, so as to maintain the nature of the others as completely separate (Plumwood, 
Feminism 52-3). Lastly, the others are instrumentalized and seen as created for the 
master, to be a means to his ends, rather than as independent ends in themselves, a view 
which, again in Youngian terms, contributes and leads to exploitation (Plumwood, 
Feminism 53). Remembering Frye’s description of the arrogant eye, it is clear that the 
masters “see with arrogant eyes which organize everything seen with reference to 
themselves and their own interests” (67). 
 Plumwood’s discussion of the master’s culture is enlightening in that by 
understanding its dualistic foundation, we can see how to create an alternative society 
through critical reconstruction, in which we affirm the “range of tasks, values and 
interests, concerns, areas of life and social orientations of real value and importance” that 
have been backgrounded and devalued, while at the same time remaining critical of and 
“transcending the false choices created by the polarized understandings of dualism” 
(Plumwood, Feminism 65, 66). Unfortunately, her position also provides another example 
of loving, knowing ignorance regarding the working class. In the opening line of this 
book Plumwood states: “It is usually at the edges where the great tectonic plates of theory 
meet and shift that we find the most dramatic developments and upheavals,” specifically 
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the intersection of liberation theories regarding gender, race, class and nature (Feminism 
1). Unfortunately, this recognition is only in theory. One specific example is found in 
Plumwood’s explanation of the logical structure of dualisms, chapter two, pages 47-55. 
Backgrounding is explained through a discussion of how “it is the slave who makes the 
master a master, the colonised who makes the coloniser” (Plumwood, Feminism 48). 
Colonization is the primary example used to illustrate radical exclusion, though there is a 
brief mention of racial and gender hyperseperation (Plumwood, Feminism 49-52). The 
same applies to the discussion of relational definition, instrumentalism and 
homogenization, in that colonization remolds the colonized, wives and colonized people 
are valued instrumentally, and that homogenization is a feature of colonial relationships 
and gender division (Plumwood, Feminism 52-4). The way in which these are oppressive 
to the working class as well is mentioned only once, specifically that instrumentalization 
is what defines a “good worker” (Plumwood, Feminism 53). This brief reference to 
classism indicates that it is an appropriate addition to this conversation, one that 
Plumwood does not follow through with. As such, Plumwood’s stance towards the 
working class is one of loving, knowing ignorance in that she claims to care about our 
oppression but only in a superficial way that does not involve actually learning about our 
differences and similarities and addressing our social subordination.  
Karen J. Warren, another prominent ecofeminist, treats class in a similar way in 
Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. Taking 
a theoretical approach, Warren’s version of ecofeminism focuses on the idea of an 
oppressive conceptual framework, “a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions 
which shape and reflect how one views oneself and one’s world” (46). The first 
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component of the framework is value-hierarchical thinking, “’Up-Down’ thinking, which 
attributes greater value to that which is higher, or Up, than to that which is lower, or 
Down,” followed by oppositional value dualisms, “disjunctive pairs in which the 
disjuncts are seen as exclusive (rather than inclusive) and oppositional (rather than 
complementary) and that places higher value (status, prestige) on one disjunct than the 
other” (Warren 46). The third and fourth components are power, specifically the power 
the Ups have over the Downs, and privilege, the unearned advantages the Ups have that 
the Downs do not (Warren 46-7). Lastly is the logic of domination “that provides the 
moral premise for ethically justifying the subordination of Downs by Ups in Up-Down 
relationships of domination and subordination” (Warren 48). As sexism and naturism 
share the same oppressive conceptual framework, feminists ought to oppose naturism, as 
well as any other similarly constructed form of oppression that works to subjugate 
women, such as racism, classism, ageism, etc (Warren 62). Thus, in order to truly liberate 
all women, as the expressed goal of feminism and ecofeminism, we must take into 
account these systems of oppression as well.   
 In addition to understanding the similar conceptual foundations of various forms 
of oppression and recognizing that women experience oppression in multiple ways, 
Warren’s specific version of ecofeminism also fulfills the unstated third-wave inclusivity 
requirement by focusing largely on the oppression of third-world women. Her version of 
ecofeminist philosophy develops out of, and is responsive to, the intersection of 
“feminism (and all the issues feminism raises concerning women and other human 
Others); nature (the natural environment), science (especially scientific ecology), 
development, and technology; and local or indigenous perspectives” (Warren 44). Thus, 
 
 
29 
any policy or practice will be prima facie wrong if it interferes with the ability of rural 
Indian women or other third-world communities to maintain their domestic economies 
and sustainable agricultural practices (Warren 45-6). This recognition is also important 
because, in many cases, the women inside the culture are the true experts, possessing a 
more comprehensive and in-depth knowledge of the area, an expertise known as 
“indigenous technical knowledge” (Warren 5). Within this discussion, Warren focuses 
specifically on developing countries, on how third-world women are responsible for most 
water collection, non-mechanized farming, and sustainable (as opposed to commercial) 
forest use and consequentially suffer disproportionately from resource depletion, 
prompting responses such as the often-cited Chipko movement in India (Warren 3-10).  
Unfortunately, the idea of valuing local perspectives is one area in which Warren 
could have, but does not, include rural working class women, in that we are one group 
within this country that possesses this type of knowledge. In fact, the most notable 
mention of the rural working class occurs in a brief discussion of food and farming in 
which she mentions the invisibility of women within this line of work (Warren 10). 
Unfortunately, Warren does not expound upon this reference to farming, therefore failing 
to adhere to her claim to value local perspectives and knowledge and her theoretical 
stance regarding the importance of class discussions. As such, Warren is likewise guilty 
of displaying a loving, knowing ignorance towards the working class.  
 While it is certainly important that both Plumwood and Warren, and feminists in 
general, pay attention to the developing world and the issues effecting third-world 
women, this focus, in combination with token references to classism, contributes to the 
invisibility of US working class women within ecofeminism. By focusing primarily on 
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those who suffer because of colonialism and imperialism, ecofeminists fulfill their 
unstated third-wave inclusivity requirement without having to actually notice or respond 
to the ways they benefit from the class-based oppression of women in their own 
communities. As Lugones states, “it is possible not to quite notice cultural imperialism 
when you are a victim of it, because it is so impersonal,” with no person-to-person 
mistreatment (Logic 39). This is also why it is easier to discuss. Distance and 
government, military and/or economic forces mitigate this mistreatment, creating a 
society in which we are rarely in a position of direct personal confrontation with those 
who suffer oppressive effects of cultural imperialism, and it is this direct personal 
confrontation that would force us to reevaluate and change our lives. It is easier to admit 
to your role in oppression when it remains an abstract cultural force, when you are not 
confronted every day, everywhere with the people you are oppressing, when you are not 
continually forced to look into the mirror that reflects a dissatisfying version of yourself, 
when you can ignore your role as oppressor. What is missing is practical engagement, the 
interactive step where those in positions of power act on the responsibility that position 
entails, challenge the principles and policies of systems that oppress, and scrutinize their 
own involvement, benefit and complacency (Lugones, “Logic” 39, Jaggar 195, Ortega 
68).  
 Taking this interactive step, going beyond loving, knowing ignorance and 
including the working class within ecofeminism in meaningful ways requires confronting 
the stereotype that we are stupid. Lisa Heldke addresses this phenomenon in her article 
“Farming Made Her Stupid,” in which she discusses how rural people are defined as 
stupid because of what we know. She makes it clear that stupid knowing is not simply 
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marginalized knowledge, that is, a form of knowledge useful in our world but not in 
urban and suburban society as a whole (152). Certainly, our knowledge is marginalized, 
in that city folks generally see no use in being able to distinguish between fields of wheat 
and oats when traveling at 55 miles per hour or judge the temperature and moisture 
content of snow based on the sound it makes under your shoes. However, when “a form 
of knowing like farming is actually regarded as having the capacity to render one unfit 
for doing philosophy” we have gone beyond mere marginalized knowledge into the realm 
of stupidification (Heldke 156). At this point we can begin to see the metrocentrism that 
permeates ecofeminism, and philosophy in general, in that the type of knowledge that 
comes from the rural experiences is not valued enough to be considered actual 
knowledge. This assumption of stupidity leads to the questions of whether or not 
rednecks can do philosophy or whether poor white trash have any moral sensibilities, and 
the surprise some feel when learning that some farmers do, in fact, read philosophy and 
ancient Greek literature.  
 This form of stupidification leads to and results from two stories about rural folks 
that simultaneously denigrate and romanticize our culture, keeping us powerless within 
the environmental field in general and ecofeminism in particular. I will use Robert Alan 
Sessions’ article “Ecofeminism and Work” to illustrate these stories, not because he is the 
only one to take this approach, but because his is one of the few articles within 
ecofeminism that actually discusses farming. The first story points the environmental 
finger of blame at farmers as the destroyers of land. Farmers are “’mining’ the soil in 
such a way that the ‘gold’ (topsoil) literally has been washed to the sea,” they “destroy 
the ‘ground of their being,’” “have sullied the waters farmers, their families, and their 
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livestock drink,” and, behaving as corporations, are “pushing their land and livestock to 
their limits” (Sessions 178-9). The first and most obvious problem with this narrative is 
its one-sided focus on the negative environmental consequences of farming, ignoring our 
positive contributions to society, such as food.  
Another, more interesting, problem within this story is that it fails to distinguish 
between the economic system dictating such practices and the farmers themselves. Most 
farmers do not want the soil to erode or water to be polluted, but we are in a system in 
which it is financially difficult, often insurmountably so, for the average farmer to make 
the switch to no-till organic farming, what with a new no-till drill priced over $50,000 
and organic certification taking three years of decreased yields without increased prices 
(US, Case). While it is clearly a better option in the long run to grow organically, we 
have short-term responsibilities and obligations that simply cannot be postponed or 
disregarded. When these financial difficulties are ignored, when we are seen as nothing 
but destructive and when we are seen as stupid, we are in a position of powerlessness 
because we have nothing positive to contribute to the environmental conversation, 
regardless that we know best what we need to do our job better.  
 The opposite side of the destroyer narrative constructs farmers as the salt of the 
earth, as simple, unpretentious, rustic, old-fashioned stewards holding the land in sacred 
trust. As Sessions states, it is lamentable that “the proverbial idyllic life of the American 
Jeffersonian yeoman farmer, a life of hard, honest, and convivial work done in close 
families and communities, insofar as it ever existed, is, for the most part, a relic of the 
past,” “disappeared from all except necromantic movements ‘back to the land’” (179). 
Rural culture declines as “solitariness is replacing the solidarity of old-style farm 
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communities,” in that “farmers’ families have become smaller and less close-knit,” with 
farmers tied more to the market and “supported by their banks and machines rather than 
their neighbors and farm communities” (Sessions 178). While more positive than the 
destroyer narrative, this depiction of farmers is likewise inaccurate. First of all, farmers 
and country folks are not environmental saints to be placed on a pedestal, as the previous 
narrative so clearly illustrates and which we do not claim or wish to be. Secondly, the life 
of the Jeffersonian yeoman farmer and, as applied to the Midwest, the later pioneer 
experience, was far from idyllic in that we were virtually isolated during winter months 
and were always one unsuccessful growing season from destitution. More specific to the 
absence of farmers and rural people within ecofeminism is the mistaken idea that our 
culture has disappeared. Though many aspects of our culture have changed, given 
decreased population, technological advances and urban cultural imperialism, many core 
values remain. For example, contrary to what Sessions states, many rural communities 
retain an incredible sense of solidarity in which the community becomes family and we 
share in each other’s accomplishments and take responsibility for another’s failure.   
 The most disturbing aspects of these farming narratives is the message that, one, 
the only contribution to society important enough to mention is negative, and two, that 
even when romanticized we still cannot provide any beneficial contribution from within 
our culture because this culture no longer exists. This not only places us again in a 
position of silence and powerlessness, but also does a disservice to the ecofeminist 
agenda of dismantling the nature/culture dualism, in that we travel between these two 
worlds, while recognizing that they are, in fact, not separate worlds. Because of this 
position, we can offer the idea of attunedness to the land that builds on, yet goes beyond 
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and strengthens, Plumwood’s concept of natural agency and Warren’s idea of a caring 
relationship with the land, thereby strengthening ecofeminism.  
In “The Concept of a Cultural Landscape: Nature, Culture and Agency in the 
Land,” Plumwood provides the idea of a cultural landscape as an example of a conceptual 
framework hiding natural agency by creating a story of human agents acting on the 
passive medium of nature (119-21). Recognizing the need for mutual standing between 
humans and nature as agents in order to develop a genuinely sustainable relationship, 
Plumwood defines agency as “active intentionality,” removing the consciousness 
requirement and recognizing “the creativity of nonhuman elements” (“Concept” 116, 
124, 122). At this point we can recognize the collaboration or interaction between human 
and non-human agents in the creation of the natural environment, as well as the role 
natural elements play in culture, for example, through land formation and environmental 
goods and services (Plumwood, “Concept” 135-6). Our task becomes the 
reconceptualization of our identity as controller and manipulator of the earth and to learn 
to live in a sustainable manner, especially given the current environmental deterioration. 
An important component is the recognition of constraints or limits, which we are to 
envisage “as resistance arising from the project of independent systems and agencies” 
and which necessitate a mode of “encounter, respect, negotiation and (possible mutual) 
adjustment” (Plumwood, “Concept” 144-5).  
While Plumwood provides an intellectual understanding of natural agency, she 
does not discuss how this new framework will play out in our relationships with nature, 
practically speaking. As such, I now turn to Warren’s text in that she provides more 
guidance for this project. As the most pragmatic element in Warren’s care-sensitive ethic, 
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when interacting with entities of moral value we ought to engage in care practices “that 
either maintain, promote, or enhance the health (well-being, flourishing) of relevant 
parties, or at least do not cause unnecessary harm” (115). As a process, rather than an 
event, a caring relationship includes caring about another through “cognitive 
attentiveness to both its health … and status as morally considerable;” taking care of or 
“having responsibilities towards the other;” giving care, i.e. competently exercising the 
skills, dispositions and capacities needed to engage in caring practices; and receiving the 
care the other may, or may not, give in return (Warren 141).  
As Plumwood and Warren state, when interacting with nature, we are to be 
respectful of its service-providing limits and attentive to its health. However, neither 
provides a helpful discussion of how to negotiate such a relationship beyond Plumwood’s 
recommendation that we cultivate “sensitivity to nature” (“Concepts 137). What we need 
is a more in-depth discussion of what it means to be sensitive to nature’s needs and 
limits, what type of relationship to the land this requires and creates, and how we can 
encourage the further development of such sensitivity. This is precisely the point at which 
rural folks can strengthen the ecofeminist endeavor in that we possess the virtue, if you 
will, of attunedness to nature, perhaps best defined as a continual recognition of and 
sensitivity to the specific abilities and needs of nature, as presented to us by nature itself, 
necessary for a respectful relationship with nature that recognizes both its status as 
independent agent and our needs. 
To begin understanding the concept of attunedness to nature it is helpful to first 
understand the world in which rural folks live. Ours is not a world in which nature is 
separate from culture, nor is it one in which culture ranks above nature. As farmers, our 
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lives are oriented around nature, our actions dictated by whether it is the season to plant 
or to harvest, our daily activities planned according to the weather. Even those of us who 
do not farm are oriented to nature as our paychecks depend on the weather and the crops, 
in that in farm communities most businesses rely heavily on the patronage of farmers and 
that the weather can often prevent us from getting to work. In this way, we understand 
not only that our rural society is dependent on nature, but that culture as a whole relies on 
nature as well, most obviously as the provider of food. Certainly, this understanding of 
culture’s dependency on nature is available to those who live in urban areas, as the 
commonly understood areas of pure culture. However, when your occupation and 
financial stability are not structured directly and primarily around nature, it is far too easy 
to create a world in which it is backgrounded, denied and forgotten, a world in which 
nature is separate, hence the need for urban environmental education programs and an 
academic movement to address this perceived separation. The world in which rural folks 
live is one in which we recognize that nature is an entity equal to, if not greater than, 
culture. It is a world in which we must work with nature.  
The world in which we live necessitates and helps to create a state of attunedness 
to the land. Our immediate and long-term survival depends on understanding the abilities 
and character of the land, which vary regionally, by county and by field, with certain 
fields being better suited for corn rather than wheat based on soil type and quality. 
However, attunedness goes beyond this scientific understanding of soil. To truly know 
the land and how best to work with it you must know how this land has been treated in 
the past; whether it has been farmed continuously since pioneer settlement; how it 
emerged from the dust bowls of the 1930’s; what type of farm equipment your 
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grandfather used; what crops your father planted, chemicals he used and yields produced; 
what was grown in that field last season, what the yields where and how all these factors 
effect the immediate health of the land this season. You also need to be aware of the 
weather, knowing how hard the winters have been for the last seven years; how much 
rain was received last fall; when the ground froze; when, how much and what types of 
snow were received; when it thawed this spring and whether there was a cycle of freezing 
and thawing. You also need to keep in mind the type and number of animals that live on 
the land, for example, the strength of the coyote population. Last but not least, you need 
to be aware of what your neighbors are planting in surrounding fields, the state of the Ag 
market and economy in general and any recent developments in farm equipment. All of 
this tells us, first, that we do not and cannot have absolute control over nature and, 
second, that farming requires incredible amounts and numerous types of knowledge.  
While this knowledge could, theoretically, be gained through studying the history 
of the land, its geography and weather patterns, and through conversations with farmers, 
it is important to recognize that this cognitive ability and factual knowledge does not get 
to the heart of attunedness to the land, in that it incorporates a strong intuitive and 
emotional component. An analogy to child raising can be helpful in understanding these 
elements. Even if you have read books about child development and are able to place a 
specific child within those categories you will be at a loss as to how to interact with a 
two-year-old unless you understand the ways that specific child is progressing through 
developmental states, the way in which she is being raised and her personality. In order to 
do your best by this child you need to be sensitive to her as a unique person and respond 
to what she gives you. This requires being in a relationship and interacting with this child 
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out of genuine care. Though some people are innately good at this, possessing the right 
personality traits and disposition, those who are not can become better through 
experience. The same applies to those who farm. Farming requires sensitivity to the land 
not simply as a resource but as an active agent we are working with, rather than against. 
This intuitive sensitivity to the land is not knowledge you can gain from textbooks but 
comes from lived experience with the land as it “grows you up [and] teaches you” 
(Plumwood, “Concepts” 127). In order for the land to teach you, you must first 
understand that the land is an entity that can teach, that we can best learn how to interact 
with the land from the land itself. To do this we need to recognize what the land can do, 
its abilities and limits, and how the land will tell us this.  
I do understand that the attunedness to the land that many farmers possess, the 
ways in which it develops and the relationship with the land that it fosters may seem 
slightly romantic and idyllic. I am well aware that some farmers are not attuned to the 
land’s needs and abilities and attempt to force the land to do their bidding. It is also true 
that some farmers are not concerned with sustainability, that some farmers use the 
knowledge gained from attunement to exploit nature and push the land to the highest 
level of productivity possible. I do not deny this, nor do I deny that even when done with 
the best of intentions, farming has negative environmental impacts. However, these 
negative elements ought not discredit or overshadow the positive contributions farmers 
can make to environmental conversations. Rather than denying the environmental harms 
resulting from farming or the destructive practices some farmers engage in, we, as 
farmers, environmentalists and/or ecofeminists, must acknowledge and learn from these 
less than desirable aspects. What has been and is being done wrong can provide excellent 
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opportunities for readjustment and growth, can deepen our understanding of attunedness 
to the land and can show the extent to which this concept needs to be focused on within 
our communities.   
Before closing, I would like to draw attention specifically to the rural folks and 
farmers who are also women. Attunedness to the land develops out of relationships that 
both men and women have with nature, leading me to discuss it in a gender-neutral 
manner. However, those women well attuned to the land are in an excellent position to 
contribute to the ecofeminist conversation. Like many others, we experience oppression 
in numerous ways, in that we are oppressed as women per se, as women working in a 
male dominated occupation, as working class, and as rural. This location can provide us 
with greater insight into the similarities between numerous systems of oppression. 
Specifically, we are in an excellent position to examine and discuss the ways in which 
classism, naturism, metrocentrism and sexism are interrelated, as well as the ways each 
system contributes to and benefits from the failure to see and appreciate attunedness to 
nature. Were ecofeminism to explore this area of thought, we would not only know more 
about attunedness and these connections, but the movement would exhibit a greater 
consistency between theoretical stances and actual practices of inclusion and interactions 
with nature.  
Within this paper, I have attempted to show ways feminism fails to include the 
working class and how this results from and contributes to our exploitation, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism, marginalization and invisibility. I have also tried to 
show how this occurs in ecofeminism and the ways in which including the rural working 
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class could benefit ecofeminist theory. My hope is that this will ease classism within both 
feminism and ecofeminism and will re-open new areas for thought and growth.  
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